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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal tax collection system is founded on the concept of
voluntary compliance.' The United States government expects tax-
payers voluntarily to compute and timely pay all taxes owed to the
federal government. Most taxpayers fulfill this obligation. 2 A minor-
ity, however, refuse to comply. Those falling within the latter cate-
gory are subject to forced collection and various penalties. This article
seeks to provide Alaska practitioners with a basic overview of the
workings of the federal tax system's forced collection scheme.
The statutory scheme of forced collection set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code ("Code") and accompanying Treasury Regulations del-
egates broad powers to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Essen-
tially, the scheme empowers the IRS to assess3 a federal tax, impose a
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1. For administrative and economic reasons, our tax collection system must be
based on voluntary compliance. It would prove administratively impossible for the
IRS to calculate and extract each citizen's taxes. The financial burden would also
prove overwhelming. Our present tax system permits the IRS to focus its resources on
those who fail to voluntarily comply. Because the government's ability to function
depends upon a constant flow of revenue, basing our tax collection system on volun-
tary compliance allows the government to function more smoothly and at less cost
than relying on a forced collection system.
2. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Measures of Voluntary Compliance, Fact
Sheet 86-4 (July 1986).
3. While the terms "assess" or "assessment" are technical terms as used in the
Code, the Code does not define them. In practice an assessment is typically regarded
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
lien for the amount assessed upon all property belonging to the tax-
payer, and, if the taxpayer still refuses voluntarily to proffer payment,
to sell the property of the taxpayer until the proceeds of the sale satisfy
the obligation. To facilitate these procedures, the IRS is given the au-
thority to summons documents and other information, including testi-
mony, from taxpayers and third parties. 4 All of these powers may be
exercised without prior judicial approval. The collection scheme also
grants taxpayers certain rights and remedies.5 These rights and reme-
dies, along with the powers of the IRS, vary according to the nature of
the case.
This article focuses on the powers and privileges arising in three
typical collection situations. First discussed are IRS procedures and
taxpayer rights in routine collection cases where the taxpayer merely
disputes the amount due or the existence of liability. Second, the arti-
cle analyzes the powers of the IRS and the remedies available to tax-
payers in jeopardy cases - situations where exigent circumstances
indicate that the IRS must act quickly in order to effect collection.
Finally, the article describes the IRS's power to look to third parties
for the collection of taxes, along with the rights of third parties subject
to potential liability. Prior to discussing the above, however, this arti-
cle briefly examines the steps involved in the collection process in or-
der to place the rights and remedies available to a taxpayer into proper
perspective.
II. OVERVIEW OF COLLECTION PROCEDURE
If a tax liability is not paid or settled at the administrative audit
level, the IRS issues a notice of deficiency called a "90-day letter."' 6
Issuance of the notice of deficiency begins a ninety-day period during
which the delinquent taxpayer may file a petition in Tax Court.7 No
assessment of any tax or collection through levy or proceeding in court
may begin until after the notice has been mailed and this ninety-day
period has expired.8 When a taxpayer timely files a petition with the
as the first official act of attaching liability for a tax to a particular person. The assess-
ment usually follows a notice of deficiency and demand for payment.
4. I.R.C. § 7602 (1982).
5. A comparison of the rights of the IRS and the taxpayer with respect to forced
collection demonstrates that the statutory scheme substantially favors the IRS. One
rationale behind this favoritism is that taxpayers' willingness to pay taxes will quickly
erode if others are successful in evading taxes. To prevent widespread evasion, the
IRS needs substantial powers to swiftly collect unpaid taxes and to impose penalties.
6. I.R.C. § 6212 (1982).
7. Id. § 6213(a) (1982). If the notice is addressed to a person outside the United
States, the taxpayer has 150 days to file a petition in the Tax Court. Id.
8. Id. Exceptions are provided for in I.R.C. §§ 6851, 6861 (1982). Section 6851
covers situations in which the IRS believes the taxpayer intends to depart or remove
[Vol. 3:269
1986] FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURES 271
Tax Court, no assessment or collection is permitted until the Tax
Court renders a final decision.9 The taxpayer may seek appropriate
injunctive relief if the IRS attempts collection or assessment before the
expiration of this waiting period.' 0 If, however, the IRS finds that
collection of the tax is in jeopardy and immediate payment on demand
is not forthcoming, the taxpayer's injunctive relief may be precluded."I
Upon expiration of the stay period, the IRS may assess the federal
tax liability.' 2 Within sixty days of making the assessment, the IRS
must provide notice of the assessment and demand payment from each
liable party.' 3 A federal tax lien then arises upon all property belong-
ing to the party liable for the tax. 14 If any liable party fails to pay the
full amount due within ten days, the IRS possesses the authority to
take forced collection action through levy.' 5 This collection authority
includes the power to seize and sell property belonging to the taxpayer
without prior judicial approval. 16
After the stay period, the IRS can also require production of
books and records relating to the existence or location of any property
belonging to the taxpayer. 17 The IRS can use its summons authority
to obtain information necessary for the collection of any tax.' 8 To the
extent the taxpayer does not voluntarily comply with the summons,
the IRS can seek court enforcement. 19
If the IRS is unsuccessful in collecting the unpaid taxes through
its administrative procedures, it may file a judicial collection proceed-
ing. Through such a proceeding, the IRS can reduce the tax liability
to judgment and obtain judicial assistance in collecting any unpaid tax
liability.20
his property from the country relatively soon or to conceal his property to impede
collection of a tax accrued but not yet due. Section 6861 deals with instances where
the IRS believes that delay will jeopardize the assessment or collection of a deficiency.
See infra notes 143-61 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of these
exceptions.
9. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982). See also id. § 7481 (1982) (describing when a Tax
Court decision becomes final).
10. Id. § 6213(a) (1982). This is in spite of the provision in the Code prohibiting
suits to restrain assessment or collection ("Anti-Injunction Act"). Id. § 7421(a)
(1982).
11. Id. § 6331(a) (1982).
12. Id. §§ 6201-6207 (Supp. 11 1985).
13. Id. § 6303(a) (1982).
14. Id. § 6321 (1982). Throughout this article, the term property will include
rights to property.
15. Id. § 6331(a) (1982).
16. Id. § 6331(b) (Supp. 11 1985).
17. Id. § 6333 (1982).
18. Id. § 7602 (1982).
19. Id. § 7604 (Supp. 11 1985).
20. Id. § 7402(a) (1982).
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In the event that the IRS is unable to collect a tax liability from
the primary taxpayer, secondary sources of payment may be ex-
amined. Examples of parties who may be liable for at least a portion
of the underlying unpaid tax include (1) individuals responsible for
unpaid employment withholding taxes, 21 (2) certain lenders or finan-
cial institutions either supplying funds for employers' payment of
taxes or paying employees directly, 22 (3) individuals who act in a fidu-
ciary capacity for delinquent taxpayers, 23 and (4) transferees who re-
ceive property from certain taxpayers who have failed to satisfy fully
their tax obligations. 24
III. NORMAL COLLECTION PROCEDURE
In the normal collection process, 25 the IRS may utilize both ad-
ministrative and judicial collection powers. The specific adminstrative
methods for collection include the federal lien,26 summons, 27 and levy
authority.28 The judicial collection process includes the right to file a
judicial proceeding to collect taxes.29 Through these proceedings, the
IRS seeks to reduce assessments to judgment and foreclose federal tax
liens on specific property. The IRS, like any other creditor, may seek
judicial assistance in collection through, for example, an action to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance. 30
21. Id. § 6672 (1982) (any person required to collect, account for, and pay any tax
for another, who fails to perform any of these duties, may be personally liable
therefor).
22. Id. § 3505 (1982) (a lender, surety, or other person not an employer with
respect to an employee or group of employees, who pays wages directly to the employ-
ees of another, or to an agent on their behalf, is liable for the amounts required to be
withheld from their wages).
23. Id. § 6901 (1982).
24. Id. (transferees include donees, heirs, legatees, devisees, distributees, and, with
respect to estate taxes, persons personally liable for any part of such tax under I.R.C.
§ 6324(a)(2)).
25. As used here, "normal collection process" refers to those situations in which a
taxpayer and the IRS disagree about the amount owed or the existence of liability, but
no extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate immediate collection.
26. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1982), discussed infra notes 31-52 and accompanying
text.
27. I.R.C. §§ 7602-7604 (Supp. 11 1985), discussed infra notes 54-66 and accom-
panying text.
28. I.R.C. §§ 6331-6344 (Supp. 111985), discussed infra notes 67-118 and accom-
panying text.
29. I.R.C. § 7403 (1982), discussed infra notes 119-141 and accompanying text.
30. I.R.C. § 7402(a) (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Ressler, 433 F. Supp. 459
(S.D. Fla. 1977).
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A. Administrative Proceedings
1. Federal Tax Lien.
a. IRSAuthority. The first collection tool available to the IRS is
the federal tax lien.31 Like other liens, it constitutes legal notice of a
claim or interest in property, preserves the status quo among certain
creditors, and establishes priority between competing claims to the
property. 32
The federal tax lien attaches to "all property and rights to prop-
erty, whether real or personal," belonging to the taxpayer.33 Because
the Code does not define "property," the state law definition applies.
34
Any exemption granted by state law will not, however, affect the IRS's
right to a lien on the taxpayer's property. 35
A federal tax lien automatically arises after assessment, issuance
of notice of the assessment, demand, and failure of the taxpayer to pay
the assessment. The law requires no filing.36 Until notice of the tax
lien is properly filed, however, deficient taxpayers may transfer their
property to purchasers and creditors free of the tax lien.
37
Certain types of property are exempted from the reach of a fed-
eral tax lien despite proper filing. Exempted property includes, but is
not limited to, certain corporate and other securities, motor vehicles,
personal property purchased at retail or casual sale, attorney's liens,
insurance contracts, and passbook loans. If, however, the transferee
possessed actual knowledge of the lien at the time of the transaction,
several of these exemptions are not available.38 The priority interest of
31. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1982).
32. Id. § 6323 (1982).
33. Id. § 6321 (1982).
34. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1958); see also Aquilano v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-14 (1960).
35. Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57. The Court held that state exemption statutes have
been preempted by the federal tax lien in favor of the United States. Once state law
creates a property right in the taxpayer sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section
6323 (decided under former section 3670), state law is inoperative to prevent the at-
tachment of federal tax liens in favor of the United States. The Court observed that
Congress had explicitly recognized the superiority of various state laws in bankruptcy
and other areas of the tax code. Because Congress had failed to do so here with
respect to federal tax liens, the Court reasoned that Congress intended such liens to be
superior, notwithstanding contrary state laws. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-
l(c) (as amended in 1979).
36. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
37. Id. § 6323(a) (1982). The Code specifies the formal requirements for the
proper filing of notice of the tax lien, rules for determining the situs of the property
subject to the lien, the form and content of the notice, and, in certain circumstances,
the indexing required for the notice. Id. § 6323(f) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f) -1
(1976).
38. I.R.C. § 6323(b) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(b)-i (1976).
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parties under security interests that arose from certain commercial or
real property construction or improvement financing arrangements en-
tered into before the tax lien was filed may also be protected. To be
entitled to this protection, the funds must be disbursed within forty-
five days after the filing of the lien or before actual knowledge of the
lien.39
Similarly, the federal tax lien will not attach to property trans-
ferred prior to the date of the assessment if the transfer is bona fide
and not voidable under various fraudulent conveyance theories. 40 It
will attach, however, to all property acquired during the life of the
lien, including property acquired after the assessment. 41
The duration of the federal tax lien is limited. Generally, it con-
tinues until the tax or a judgment arising out of such liability is paid or
becomes unenforceable due to lapse of time.42 The period of limita-
tions for collection of a tax liability after assessment is six years.43 The
life of a lien can, however, be extended by agreement or by the timely
filing of a judicial proceeding. 44 If extended, the IRS must refile the
notice of the lien in order to retain its priority.45
b. Taxpayer Rights. A taxpayer is entitled to certain very limited
rights and remedies with respect to federal tax liens. First, the IRS
must serve the person it believes to be liable with a notice of the assess-
39. I.R.C. § 6323(c) (1982).
40. United States v. Morgan, 554 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D. Colo. 1982); see also
Commissioner v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 45-47 (1958).
41. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
42. I.R.C. § 6322 (1982).
43. Id. § 6502(a) (1982).
44. United States v. Hodes, 355 F.2d 746, 748-49 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed,
386 U.S. 901 (1967). The life of the lien may be extended by the timely filing of a
judicial proceeding because such action tolls the running of the statute of limitations
without extinguishing the lien. The lien continues to exist independently of the suit.
Id. at 748. Indeed, it continues to exist independently of a judgment entered in favor
of the United States. Under most state laws, once a judgment is rendered, the under-
lying lien merges into the judgment, and the creditor must collect on the judgment.
The tax lien, however, does not merge with the judgment. Because the IRS can at-
tempt collection through levy or by judicial proceeding, I.R.C. § 6502(a) (1982), the
court in Hodes reasoned that Congress intended the IRS to have two collection tools.
This was significant in Hodes because the IRS had properly filed its notice of tax lien
in 1955. In 1958, the government brought suit and reduced its assessment to judg-
ment. However, the IRS then failed to comply with the requirements of New York
law to obtain a judgment lien. Its judgment lien was not properly perfected until
1963. The government's 1958 judgment was thus subordinate to parties who properly
recorded liens in the interim. Having failed to secure its rights by judgment, the IRS
brought suit to enforce its 1955 tax lien. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held the lien to be valid and superior to all those recorded after the
notice of tax lien. Id. at 749.
45. Id. § 6323(g) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6323 (g)-l (1976).
1986] FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURES 275
ment and a demand for payment before a federal tax lien can arise. To
perfect service the notice and demand must be left at the taxpayer's
dwelling or usual place of business, or be mailed to the taxpayer's last
known address. Notice and demand must be rendered as soon as prac-
ticable, but no later than sixty days after the making of the
assessment.
46
Second, the taxpayer can require the IRS to issue a certificate of
release of a lien if the liability is paid in full, the taxpayer has posted a
bond for the amount due, or the lien has become legally unenforce-
able.47 The certificate, which serves as conclusive proof of the extin-
guishment of the lien,48 must be issued within thirty days of the
occurrence of one of these events.4 9
Finally, the taxpayer may seek relief in a quiet title action in
which the taxpayer attempts to remove the lien from the title to the
property.50 This does not, however, constitute a proper procedure for
contesting the validity of the underlying tax liability.5 ' The quiet title
action is limited to situations involving some defect in the collection
procedure or full payment of the liability.52
2. Summons.
a. IRS Authority. The IRS possesses broad authority to "can-
vass" internal revenue districts in search of tax liabilities5 3 and to issue
summons to facilitate the obtainment of information pertinent to col-
lection.54 The summons is an administrative remedy for which the
IRS typically need not seek judicial approval. 55 It allows the IRS to
examine books, records, and other data belonging to the taxpayer or
third parties responsible for the taxpayer's books and records, take
testimony of individuals with information regarding collection, and
enter premises for the examination of taxable objects.56 When persons
fail to timely or fully comply with the summons, the IRS may seek
enforcement of the summons through court order.5 7
46. I.R.C. § 6303(a) (1982).
47. Id. § 6325(a) (1982).
48. Id. § 6325(f)(1) (1982).
49. Id. § 6325(a) (1982).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1982).
51. Falik v. United States, 343 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1965).
52. Id.
53. I.R.C. § 7601 (1982).
54. Id. § 7602 (1982).
55. Id. The IRS needs prior approval to issue a "John Doe" summons. See infra
text accompanying note 66.
56. Id.; I.R.C. § 7606 (1982).
57. Id. § 7604 (Supp. 11 1985).
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b. Taxpayer Rights. Because the summons may seek information
that could result in criminal prosecution, there are limits on the IRS's
ability to search for and seize tax information. Unlike in criminal
prosecutions, however, the IRS need not establish probable cause prior
to a search and seizure. The IRS may issue any summons "necessary"
to a tax investigation.5 8 In essence, this means that the investigation
must be related to a legitimate and proper concern of the IRS, that the
inquiry must be relevant to that purpose, and that the IRS must not
already possess the information sought. 59
The taxpayer also enjoys the fifth amendment right not to incrim-
inate himself. Thus, where the IRS has made a criminal investigation
referral to the Department of Justice, the summons authority is re-
stricted.60 If the referral has been made, no civil summons may issue
or be enforced.61 The IRS may, however, continue to use civil sum-
mons prior to such referral even when the agents conducting the inves-
tigation recognize the possibility of referral for criminal prosecution. 62
In such cases, the IRS must act in good faith in enforcing its civil
summons.
63
Finally, where the IRS serves a summons on a third-party record-
keeper, the taxpayer is entitled to notice of the third-party summons
and the opportunity to file a proceeding to quash it.64 This rule does
not apply when the summons is issued to the taxpayer's agent merely
to determine whether records have been kept.65 "John Doe sum-
mons," which do not identify the potentially liable person, may issue
only after the IRS has established in a court proceeding that (1) the
investigation relates to an identifiable person, or ascertainable group,
58. See id. § 7605(b) (1982); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United
States v. MacKay, 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
59. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 52-59; MacKay, 608 F.2d at 833; see also United States
v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (The IRS summoned a parent corpo-
ration to turn over the minutes of all board meetings of it and its affiliated corpora-
tions, including the parent's consolidated income tax return. The parent corporation
refused to make available all of the minutes, offering instead to make available only
those which might have a bearing on the determination of the parent corporation's
income tax liability. The court enforced the summons since the request for production
was made for a legitimate purpose and the documents might have been relevant to that
inquiry.).
60. I.R.C. § 7602(c) (1982).
61. Id.
62. United States v. Genser, 602 F.2d 69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928
(1979).
63. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). The taxpayer bears
the burden of proving that the IRS acted in bad faith. Id. at 316.
64. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (1982). Third-party record-keepers include banks, savings
and loan associations, consumer reporting agents, attorneys, accountants, brokers,
and other persons who may extend credit to the taxpayers. Id. § 7609(a)(3) (1982).
65. Id. § 7609(a)(4) (1982).
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(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing such person may have vio-
lated the tax laws, and (3) the information sought is not readily avail-
able from other sources. 66
3. Levy.
a. IRS Authority. The third, and likely most potent administra-
tive tool available to the IRS for collection, is its levy authority. With-
out the need for prior judicial approval, the IRS is authorized to seize
and sell property belonging to the taxpayer.67 The IRS is entitled to
levy as often as necessary to collect the amount due plus the expenses
of the levy. 68
A federal tax levy attaches upon service of notice on the person in
possession of the property, whether that person is the taxpayer or a
third party.69 Virtually all types of property are subject to a federal
tax levy. 70 A levy, however, attaches only to property owned by the
taxpayer at the time of service of the levy. 71 Thus, the levy will not
attach to property transferred prior to service of the levy, 72 nor to
property acquired afterward, excluding wages.73
Upon demand of the IRS, any person in possession of property
upon which a levy has been effected must surrender the stated prop-
erty. The only exceptions to this rule apply to persons who have al-
ready subjected property to an attachment or judicial execution7 4 and
to organizations that have issued life insurance or endowment policies
to the delinquent taxpayer.75 When a person fails to surrender the
property as required, he becomes personally liable to the United States
in a sum equal to the value of the property, up to the amount of the
taxes, costs, and interest.76 In addition, any person who fails to sur-
render property without reasonable cause is subject to a penalty equal
to fifty percent of the amount described above. This penalty is not
66. Id. § 7609(f) (1982).
67. Id. § 6331 (Supp. 11 1985).
68. Id. § 6331(c) (1982).
69. Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1 (as amended in 1983).
70. I.R.C. § 6334 (Supp. 11 1985). See infra note 79 regarding property exempt
from federal tax levy.
71. I.R.C. § 6331(b) (Supp. 11 1985).
72. See, e.g., Lapp v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 386, 390 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
73. I.R.C. § 6331(e)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1(a) (as amended in 1983);
Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-2(c) (1979).
74. I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982).
75. Id. § 6332(b) (1982). Such a levy is to be regarded as a demand by the IRS
for payment of advances the taxpayer could receive on that date plus any amount
advanced to the taxpayer while the organization knew of the lien. The amount is
payable within 90 days of service of the notice of the levy.
76. Id. § 6332(c)(1) (1982).
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credited against the amount due.77 If, on the other hand, a person in
possession of a taxpayer's property honors a federal tax levy, he is
discharged of any liability to the delinquent taxpayer with respect to
such property. 78
b. Taxpayer Rights.
(1) Statutory Rights. The law grants a taxpayer several statu-
tory rights to assure that the levy authority is not abused. First, cer-
tain types of property are exempted from the effect of a federal tax
levy, although some of these protections are limited to a maximum
appraised value.79 At the time of the levy, an officer seizing property
is required to appraise the exempt property and set aside the appropri-
ate amount for the owner.80 If the taxpayer objects at the time of the
seizure to the valuation fixed by the officer, the IRS must summon
three disinterested persons to make the valuation. 8'
Second, a taxpayer is entitled to written notice of the intent to
levy at least ten days in advance. This notice must be given in person,
left at the taxpayer's dwelling place or usual place of business, or sent
by certified or registered mail to his last known address. Notice is not
required, however, if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that collection
of the tax is in jeopardy.8 2
Third, the IRS must provide the taxpayer with notice of any
seizure as soon as practicable after taking the property. Notice must
be in the form of a written statement of the amount due and a descrip-
tion of the property seized. 83 In addition, the IRS must give notice to
77. Id. § 6332(c)(2) (1982).
78. Id. § 6332(d) (1982).
79. Id. § 6334(a) (1982). Exempted property includes:
1) wearing apparel and school books necessary for the taxpayer or his
family members;
2) if the taxpayer is the head of a family, then so much of the fuel,
provisions, furniture, and personal effects in the household, and of the arms
for personal use, livestock, and poultry of the taxpayer, as does not exceed
$1,500 in value;
3) up to $1000 of books and tools for a trade;
4) unemployment benefits;
5) undelivered mail;
6) certain annuity and pension payments;
7) workmen's compensation;
8) money for the support of minors; and
9) a small amount of wages and salary.
No other property is exempt from the federal tax levy, regardless of any other federal
or state law to the contrary. Id. § 6334(c) (Supp. I 1985); Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-
l(c) (as amended in 1979).
80. I.R.C. § 6334(b) (1982).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 6331(a) (1982).
83. Id. § 6335(a) (1982).
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the owner of its intent to sell the property and publish notice describ-
ing the property as well as the time, place, manner, and conditions of
its sale in a newspaper circulated in the county in which the seizure is
made. If no such paper exists, notice must be posted at the local post
office and in at least two other public places in the relevant county. 4
Fourth, the taxpayer is given statutory rights to contest the man-
ner of sale. The sale must not be less than ten nor more than forty
days from the time of public notice and, except under special circum-
stances, the sale must occur within the county in which the property
was seized.8 5 Prior to the sale, the IRS must determine the minimum
price for which the property will be sold. If no offer is made for the
minimum price, the property is declared to be purchased by the
United States at the minimum price. The United States will be treated
as having received that amount.8 6 However, because the IRS has exer-
cised its authority to prescribe through regulations the manner of the
seized property's sale,87 the taxpayer's right to contest the reasonable-
ness of the sale is limited.
Finally, the taxpayer has the right to redeem the seized property
from a foreclosure sale pursuant to a federal tax levy. To redeem the
property he must pay, prior to the sale, the full amount of the tax
liability owed and the expenses of the proceeding. 88 Upon making
such a payment, the taxpayer is entitled to the return of the property
as well as cessation of all further levy proceedings pursuant to that
liability. In the case of real property, the taxpayer has the right to
redeem within 180 days after the sale by paying the purchaser the
amount paid at the sale, plus interest at the rate of twenty percent.8 9
(2) Administrative Remedies. In addition to statutory protec-
tions, a taxpayer may contest federal tax levies through a broad range
of options at the administrative level. 90 Many of these procedures,
84. Id. § 6335(b) (1982).
85. Id. § 6335(d) (1982).
86. Id. § 6335(e)(1) (1982).
87. Id. § 6335(e)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1(c) (as amended in 1972).
88. I.R.C. § 6337 (1982). In order to redeem, the taxpayer must pay the full
amount of the liability, not merely the value of the piece of property. This requirement
accords with the power of the IRS to levy upon the taxpayer's property as often as
necessary to collect the amount due together with the expenses of levy. See supra text
accompanying note 68. Requiring the IRS to return the property to the taxpayer
upon being paid its value when a deficiency would remain on the liability would only
increase administrative expenses. The IRS would simply levy on the property again.
89. I.R.C. § 6337(b) (West Supp. 1986); Treas. Reg. § 301.6337-1(b)(2) (as
amended in 1972).
90. While some of the administrative remedies discussed below become available
upon imposition of the lien, as a practical matter taxpayers typically invoke these
remedies at the levy stage of the proceeding. A lien is merely a defensive tool designed
to protect the government's interest in property. A levy is an offensive tool under
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however, are available only at the discretion of the IRS, and the tax-
payer must establish that such options should be pursued.9' Nor-
mally, this requires showing that there exists a good reason to delay
collection action and that such delay is not likely to result in dimin-
ished collectibility.
The first such option involves the extension of time for making
payment. If the taxpayer determined the tax liability on his return, he
may be allowed a reasonable period, not to exceed six months, for
payment of the taxes. 92 However, in the case of estate taxes, an exten-
sion of up to twelve months is normally allowed, and an extension of
up to ten years may be had upon a showing of reasonable cause. 93 If
the IRS determined the tax liability, the date fixed for payment may be
extended by a period typically not exceeding eighteen months. In ex-
ceptional cases, the taxpayer may extend the time for payment for an
additional twelve-month period upon a showing that payment by the
due date will result in undue hardship to the taxpayer. 94 No such
additional extension may be granted when the deficiency is due to neg-
ligence, intentional disregard of rules or regulations, or fraud with in-
tent to evade the tax.95
Second, the taxpayer may persuade the IRS to agree to release a
levy and to return property levied upon. The IRS may only do so if it
determines that such action will facilitate collection of the liability, 96
or that the property was levied upon wrongfully. 97
Third, the taxpayer may petition for a certificate of discharge of
specific property from the federal tax lien.98 This certificate serves as
conclusive proof that the IRS has no legal interest in the property,
although the federal tax lien remains valid.99 Before such a certificate
will be issued, a taxpayer must show that he has other property worth
at least twice the amount of the underlying liability or that the govern-
which the IRS seeks to affirmatively collect unpaid taxes. Not until the IRS makes an
effort to collect through levy is a taxpayer likely to invoke these rights.
91. Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1 (as amended in 1972).
92. I.R.C. § 6161(a) (1982). The extension can exceed six months if the taxpayer
is abroad at the time. Id.
93. Id. § 6161(a)(2) (1982).
94. Id. § 6161(b)(1) (1982).
95. Id. § 6161(b)(3) (1982).
96. Id. § 6343(a) (1982). To help facilitate collection the IRS may also impose
conditions on the release of levy, including requiring financial information, an install-
ment payment agreement, a waiver of the statute of limitations for collection, or a
bond. Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1972). A release does not oper-
ate to prevent any subsequent levy. I.R.C. § 6343(a) (1982).
97. I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b) (as amended in 1972).
98. I.R.C. § 6325(b) (as amended in 1972).
99. Id. § 6325(f)(1)(B) (1982).
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ment's interest in the specific property is worthless.100
Fourth, a taxpayer may attempt to convince the IRS to agree to
substitute its interest in the levied property for an interest in the pro-
ceeds of a private sale of the property. 01 This substitution discharges
the property from the federal tax levy and lien, thus facilitating private
sale of the property.10 2 The taxpayer must agree to hold the sale pro-
ceeds in escrow, subject to a claim by the IRS in the amount of the
underlying federal tax lien, in order to obtain this discharge. 0 3 In
addition, the sale must divest the taxpayer of all interest in the prop-
erty sought to be discharged. 1°4
Fifth, issuance of a certificate of subordination of a lien is within
the power of the IRS. 105 This certificate of subordination conclusively
proves that another interest is legally superior to the federal tax
lien. 106 In order to obtain a certificate of subordination, the taxpayer
must either (1) pay over to the IRS the amount by which the federal
tax lien is to be subordinated, or (2) demonstrate that issuance of the
certificate will increase the value of the property and the likelihood of
collecting the tax. 10 7 A typical example of the latter occurs when a
near insolvent taxpayer who owns a business likely to appreciate if
given capital finds a lender who will make the necessary loan, but only
on the condition that the lender receive a first priority interest in the
property.10 8
Finally, the IRS possesses the authority to compromise any liabil-
ities arising under the Code. 109 Generally, the IRS will agree to com-
promise only when there is some doubt as to whether (1) the tax
deficiency is legally and factually sound, or (2) the IRS will be able to
effect complete collection of the liability.110 Moreover, the IRS will
refuse to compromise a criminal liability unless it believes the taxpayer
merely violated a regulatory provision of the Code or a related statute
without an intent to defraud."'I
The offer to compromise is submitted on Form 656 (offer of com-
promise). Submission of an offer of compromise does not automati-
cally defer or stay collection. Deferral of collection is at the discretion
100. Id. § 6325(b) (1982).
101. Id. § 6325(b)(3) (1982).
102. Id. § 6325(f)(1)(B) (1982).
103. Id. § 6325(b)(3) (1982).
104. Treas. Reg. § 301.6325-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1982).
105. I.R.C. § 6325(d) (1982).
106. Id. § 6325(f)(1)(C) (1982).
107. Id. § 6325(d) (1982).
108. Treas. Reg. § 301.6325-1(d)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1982).
109. I.R.C. § 7122(a) (1982).
110. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(a) (1967).
111. Id. § 301.7122-1(b) (1967).
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of the collection division and will be extended only when the interests
of the United States will not be jeopardized by the delay. 112
The IRS typically requires a statement of financial condition as
part of an offer of compromise, particularly where the offer is premised
on possible uncollectibility, and may require a collateral agreement as
to future income."13 Under a collateral agreement, taxpayers must
generally pay a certain percentage of their income during each year for
a ten-year period. The IRS permits most taxpayers to retain a certain
minimum allowance for which no taxes will be paid. As the income
increases above this minimum level, the percentage payable to the IRS
also increases. A collateral agreement always requires annual report-
ing, including submission of copies of each year's tax returns.
As with any compromise, the terms and conditions of an offer of
compromise are negotiable and turn upon the likelihood that the lia-
bility exists and that the tax will be collected. One fixed condition,
however, is that the taxpayer must agree to a limited waiver of the
statute of limitations on the assessment and/or collection of the tax
liability. 114
As a practical matter, discussions regarding a compromise usu-
ally begin informally between the revenue officer assigned to collect
the delinquent account and the taxpayer. After these initial discus-
sions, the taxpayer must submit the formal offer of compromise along
with the amount offered in compromise. 115 If the formal offer is re-
jected or withdrawn, the IRS must return the money tendered without
interest unless the taxpayer has agreed to apply the amount tendered
to the liability.11 6 If the IRS accepts the formal offer, all liabilities
encompassed by it are conclusively settled, unless either the taxpayer
or the government can prove that it was procured by fraud, or under
mutual mistake or duress. 1 7 Acceptance occurs when the taxpayer
receives written notification from the IRS." 8
112. Id. § 301.7122-1(d) (1967).
113. Id. § 301.7122-1(d)(3) (1967).
114. Id. § 301.7122-1(f) (1967). The waiver must last "for the period during
which the offer is pending, or the period during which any installment remains un-
paid, and for one year thereafter." Id.
115. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(d)(1) (1967).
116. Id. § 301.7122-1(d)(4) (1967).
117. Id. § 301.7122-1(b) (1967); see, e.g., Cooper Agency v. United States, 301 F.
Supp. 871, 875 (D.S.C. 1969) (compromise settlements of tax liabilities conforming to
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code are contracts governed by the rules gener-
ally applicable to contracts), aff'dper curiam 422 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 904 (1970).
118. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(d)(3) (1967).
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B. Judicial Proceedings
1. IRS Authority. The IRS may, of course, seek judicial assist-
ance in collecting tax liabilities.1 19 As a practical matter, the IRS usu-
ally seeks judicial assistance only when it finds its administrative
procedures for collecting taxes ineffective.
In the typical collection action, the IRS seeks to reduce the fed-
eral tax assessment to judgment and to foreclose the tax liens on spe-
cific property. 120 But the IRS can also request more unusual relief.
For example, the IRS may obtain certain relief on an ex parte basis,
including the authority to open, or at least be present at the opening
of, a safety deposit box, and to obtain a warrant to enter property
without the consent of the owner. 121 The IRS also may attempt to set
aside a conveyance as fraudulent when it believes the taxpayer trans-
ferred the property prior to the federal tax lien or levy in order to
avoid payment.12 2 State laws regarding fraudulent conveyances deter-
mine whether the transaction will be set aside for the benefit of the
United States. 123 Such laws typically require a showing that the prop-
erty was transferred by an insolvent debtor, or a debtor rendered insol-
vent by the transfer, to a third party for legally insufficient
consideration with an intent to defraud or evade creditors. 24
If a creditor of a taxpayer whose property is subject to a federal
tax lien initiates a legal action against that taxpayer and fails to name
the United States as a party to the action, the IRS may intervene in
order to assert the federal tax lien against the property in question. 25
If the United States is not joined as a party, and notice of the tax lien
was properly filed prior to the suit, the action will not affect the lien.12 6
Moreover, if the United States is denied the right to intervene in any
such action, the adjudication will have no effect upon the federal tax
lien. 127
119. I.R.C. §§ 7402(a), 7403(a) (1982).
120. In an action to foreclose a federal tax lien, "all persons having liens upon or
claiming any interest in the property involved [must] be made parties thereto." Id.
§ 7403(b) (1982). However, the taxpayer would not be able to assert the omission of
this requirement to his benefit because this provision is intended to benefit the party
having the lien or claiming the interest.
121. See, e.g., In re Gerwig, 461 F. Supp. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
122. I.R.C. § 6901 (1982). Generally, when a conveyance is found under the appli-
cable state law to have been fraudulent, it is deemed void and thus the creditor can
reach the property.
123. See John Owenbey Co. v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1981); see
also Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
124. Alaska's fraudulent conveyance statute, which resembles that of most other
states, is ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (1985).
125. I.R.C. § 7424 (1982).
126. Id. § 7425(a)(1) (1982).
127. Id. § 7424 (1982).
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2. Taxpayer and Third-Party Rights. The taxpayer or a poten-
tially liable third party may also invoke judicial powers. Within
ninety days of the mailing of the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer has
the right to file a petition in the Tax Court contesting the alleged defi-
ciency.'28 The filing of a petition stays further assessment or collec-
tion until the Tax Court's final decision, unless the IRS finds the
collection of the tax in jeopardy.129 The taxpayer need not prepay the
assessed liability in order to file such a petition.
Under limited circumstances, a taxpayer or third party is entitled
to injunctive relief. The Anti-Injunction Act represents the primary
obstacle to obtaining such relief. The Act provides that, subject to
certain statutory and judicial exceptions, "no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed." 1 30 The noted statutory excep-
tions to the Act are as follows. Temporary injunctions may issue
when the IRS attempts (1) to assess or collect taxes through levy or
court proceeding during the ninety- or 150-day period following the
mailing of the deficiency notice, 131 or (2) to collect the remainder of a
100% penalty through levy or court proceeding prior to the final reso-
lution of a proceeding timely filed by a taxpayer who is contesting
liability and has posted the appropriate bond.132 Permanent injunc-
tions may issue when the IRS attempts (1) to determine an additional
deficiency for the same calendar year relating to the basis of a petition
already filed in Tax Court by a taxpayer challenging a prior notice of
deficiency sent by the IRS, 1 33 or (2) to sell property when a third party
has filed a wrongful levy suit, has demonstrated the superiority of his
rights to the property, and has shown that he would be irreparably
injured by levy or sale of the property. 3 4
128. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
129. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982). Jeopardy assessments, specifically excepted from sec-
tion 6213(a) and provided for in sections 6851 and 6861, are discussed infra notes 142-
61 and accompanying text.
130. I.R.C. § 7421 (1982). Penalties are to be regarded as taxes for purposes of this
statute. Id. § 6671(a) (1982); Herring v. Moore, 735 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1984). But see
LeBlanc v. Shirey, 598 F. Supp. 747, 749-50 (E.D. Tex. 1984) (criticizing the result
reached in Herring, though the court was bound to follow it), aff'd sub nom. Capp v.
Eggars, 782 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1986).
131. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982).
132. Id. § 6672(b) (1982). This exception is more fully discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 187-90.
133. I.R.C. § 6212(a), (c) (1982); Id. § 7421 (1982).
134. I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1), (b)(1) (1982). In a wrongful levy proceeding, courts can
enjoin the sale of the property levied upon and (1) order its return if the United States
still possesses the property, (2) grant a money judgment for the amount levied upon,
or (3) order a monetary judgment against the United States and in favor of the third
party entitled to the property in an amount equal to either the amount received by the
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Despite the broad preclusive language of the Anti-Injunction Act,
the Supreme Court in Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation
Co. 135 recognized a limited judicial exception to the Act. For this ex-
ception to apply, the taxpayer must prove that (1) the government
cannot succeed on the merits of the case, and (2) irreparable harm will
occur to the taxpayer if injunctive relief is denied. 136 Courts take a
restrictive view of this judicial exception. They require a showing that
the government could not possibly succeed under any interpretation of
the facts and that more than mere economic hardship will occur.
137
Injunctive relief under this judicial exception has, therefore, seldom
been granted.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court apparently created a
new judicial exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. In South Carolina
v. Regan, 13s the Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act was not in-
tended to bar an action where Congress has not provided the taxpayer
"with an alternative legal way in which to challenge the validity of a
tax."139 The plurality opinion specifically declined to decide whether
the case fell within the Williams Packing exception.140 Because of the
peculiar fact situation in Regan, the viability of this new exception
remains unclear.141
IRS from its sale or the fair market value of the property just prior to the sale, which-
ever is greater, if the property has been sold. Id. § 7426(b) (1982).
135. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
136. Id. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
137. See Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 5-8; see also Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at
736-37; Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1960) (judicial exception is based
on extraordinary and exceptional circumstances and must be maintained as a narrow
exception); Westgate-California Corp. v. United States, 496 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1974)
(probable corporate bankruptcy because of inability to obtain credit due to tax liens
insufficient to justify injunction where taxpayer failed to show that government had no
possibility of prevailing on the merits); Smaldone v. Kurtz, 450 F. Supp. 1138, 1141
(D.D.C. 1978) (due process violation by IRS might suffice if other essentials of equita-
ble jurisdiction are present); Detwiler v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 695, 699 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (economic hardship was insufficient even where plaintiff found himself
"mired in quicksands of unmanageable debts"), aff'd, 544 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977); Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz,
368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973) (non-profit organization was granted injunctive relief
against the IRS because it failed to rule that the corporation was a charitable and
educational organization exempt from federal taxes and there was no possibility that
government would prevail on the merits of the exemption question, the corporation
would suffer irreparable harm of probable extinction in the absence of injunction, and
the corporation had been subjected to selective treatment for political and ideological
reasons).
138. 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
139. Id. at 373.
140. Id. at 372-73.
141. Regan resulted when I.R.C. § 103(a), which exempts from a taxpayer's gross
income the interest earned on the obligations of any state, was amended by Congress
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When available, injunctive relief may provide the taxpayer with
several practical benefits. First, when considering an application for
injunctive relief, a district court typically requires the attendance of an
Assistant United States Attorney or a trial attorney from the Depart-
ment of Justice Tax Division. This provides the taxpayer with a sepa-
rate administrative review of the IRS's action. Because the
Department of Justice considers litigation hazards and costs, it may be
more amenable to a reasonable resolution of the dispute. Second, dis-
trict courts prefer compromise resolutions, particularly when taxpay-
ers allege egregious or unfair conduct by IRS agents. To that end,
district courts may exert pressure on the government to seek an amica-
ble resolution of the controversy, especially where the controversy is
limited to the particular taxpayer. For these reasons, an action for
injunctive relief in an onerous levy situation may lead to a compromise
or favorable resolution of the problem.
IV. JEOPARDY AND TERMINATION ASSESSMENTS
A. IRS Authority
The preceding discussion centered on the normal collection situa-
tion. The IRS possesses greater collection authority where exigent cir-
cumstances indicate that the collection of taxes may be jeopardized if
collection efforts are not immediately set in motion. In these emer-
gency collection situations, referred to as jeopardy or termination as-
sessments, the law permits the IRS to expedite the assessment and
collection process. 142
The two types of emergency assessments, jeopardy and termina-
tion, are fairly similar. To make either assessment, the IRS must de-
termine that the taxpayer is (1) planning to depart from the United
States or to conceal himself, (2) designing to immediately place his
in 1982. The amendment added a new provision, § 103(j)(1), which required that
state obligations be issued in registered, as opposed to bearer, form in order to qualify
for the § 103(a) exemption. Otherwise, the interest earned on them would be taxable
income. Because bearer form bonds would carry a lower price than comparably regis-
tered form bonds, the new provisions effectively forced states to issue only registered
form bonds. South Carolina filed a complaint with the Supreme Court against the
then Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief on
the ground that § 103(j)(1) violated the tenth amendment and the doctrine of inter-
governmental tax immunity. The Secretary, never responding to the merits of the
claim, argued that the action was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. If the action
were barred, South Carolina effectively had no remedy. If no bearer bonds were is-
sued, there would be no injury and no challenge could be made to the new provision.
If South Carolina issued bearer bonds, the purchasers, not South Carolina, would
incur the tax liability. Under these circumstances, the state would have no statutory
procedure by which to contest the constitutionality of § 103(j)(l).
142. I.R.C. §§ 6851, 6861 (1982).
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property beyond the reach of the government, or (3) dangerously near
financial insolvency.143 The only difference between the two assess-
ments is that a jeopardy assessment is made after the due date of a
taxpayer's tax return, including extensions, while a termination assess-
ment is made before the end of a tax year and is inapplicable after the
due date of the tax return. 44
If the IRS determines that delay may jeopardize collection be-
cause of the existence of one or more of the prescribed situations, it
may immediately make an assessment of the tax deficiency.145 Within
five days of such assessment, the IRS must provide the taxpayer with a
written statement setting forth the information upon which it bases the
assessment.' 46 Next, the IRS must issue a notice of deficiency. As in
the normal collection process, this marks the beginning of the period
for filing a petition in the Tax Court.' 47 The IRS must also give the
taxpayer notice of the assessment and a demand for payment.' 48 Un-
like the normal collection process, however, the IRS need not wait ten
days after fulfilling the notice requirements before taking collection
action through levy.' 49
Although the IRS may immediately levy upon the taxpayer's
property pursuant to a jeopardy or termination assessment, it cannot
sell the property prior to the expiration of the taxpayer's time to seek
administrative review or file a petition in Tax Court. 150 When the tax-
payer timely requests administrative review, the IRS cannot sell levied
property until the expiration of the filing date for district court review.
If an appeal follows, the IRS cannot sell the property until the district
court's decision becomes final.'51 If, instead of seeking administrative
review, the taxpayer timely petitions the Tax Court and files the ap-
propriate bond, a final decision by the Tax Court is a prerequisite to
the sale of the property.' 52 These limitations do not apply, however,
143. Id. § 6851 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1978).
144. I.R.C. § 6851(a)(4) (1982).
145. Id. §§ 6851(a), 6861(a) (1982). By contrast, in the normal collection process,
the IRS must issue a "90-day letter" and then wait the 90 days for the taxpayer to file
a petition in Tax Court. If such petition is filed, the Tax Court's decision must be-
come final before the IRS can make an assessment. See supra text accompanying
notes 6-11.
146. I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1) (1982). Receipt of this notice begins the running of the
period for the assessment. Id. § 7429(a)(2) (1982).
147. Id. §§ 6851(b), 6861(b) (1982).
148. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6851-1(c) (as amended in 1978), 301.6861-1(d) (as amended
in 1982).
149. I.R.C. § 6331(a) (1982).
150. Id. § 6863(b)(3)(A)(i) (1982).
151. Id. § 6863(c)(1)(A) (1982).
152. Id. § 6863(b)(3)-(c) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6863-2(a) (as amended in 1978).
District court determinations regarding adminstrative decisions on the making of as-
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when the taxpayer consents to the sale, the IRS determines that the
expense of maintaining the property will greatly reduce the net pro-
ceeds from its sale, or the property is of a perishable nature. 153
B. Taxpayer Rights
The taxpayer has two procedures by which to challenge jeopardy
or termination assessments.' 54 First, a taxpayer may obtain a stay of
collection by filing a bond with the Secretary of Treasury in an amount
equal to the assessment.15 5 If the assessment relates to a deficiency
over which the Tax Court has jurisdiction, the stay is subject to the
condition that the taxpayer file a petition with the Tax Court. Absent
the timely filing of such a petition, the bond, together with interest
from the date of the jeopardy notice, will be paid over to the IRS upon
notice and demand. 156
Second, the taxpayer may petition the district court for an expe-
dited review of the jeopardy or termination assessment. 5 7 In order to
obtain such review, however, the taxpayer must first seek an adminis-
trative review of the assessment within thirty days of receipt of the
written statement of information detailing the grounds for the assess-
ment.' 58 After seeking administrative review, the taxpayer must file
suit for review in district court within thirty days after the earlier of
the day the IRS gives notice of its administrative review decision, or
the sixteenth day after the taxpayer requests such administrative re-
view. 159 Within twenty days after the filing of the taxpayer's request
for review, the district court must decide whether the IRS reasonably
made the assessment in an appropriate amount.' 60 The IRS bears the
burden of proving the reasonableness of the assessment, while the bur-
den of proving the reasonableness of the amount rests with the
taxpayer. 6 1'
sessments are final and conclusive; they cannot be appealed. I.R.C. § 7429(f) (1982).
Consequently, when the taxpayer opts for administrative review, the property levied
upon may be sold by the IRS, at the latest, after the district court renders its decision.
In contrast, Tax Court decisions may be appealed and thus may not become final for a
much longer period.
153. I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3)(B), (c)(2) (1982).
154. The taxpayer may also challenge the substance of the assessment through Tax
Court or through refund litigation.
155. I.R.C. § 6863(a) (1982).
156. Id. § 6863(b)(1) (1982).
157. Id. § 7429 (1982).
158. Id. § 7429(a) (1982).
159. Id. § 7429(b)(1) (1982).
160. Id. § 7429(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1985).
161. Id. § 7429(g) (1982).
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V. COLLECTION FROM SECONDARY SOURCES
Circumstances exist in which the IRS may assess federal tax lia-
bilities against secondary sources and seek collection from these
sources in addition to the primary taxpayer. One such situation oc-
curs when an entity has failed to pay the employment and social secur-
ity taxes withheld from the wages of its employees. 162 A fiduciary or
transferee may also be held liable in certain contexts. 163
A. Liability for Withholding Taxes
Employers have an obligation to withhold certain social security
and income taxes from the wages of their employees and to keep such
funds in accounts separate from their general cash accounts. 164 Taxes
withheld by employers are typically called trust fund taxes. 165 Finan-
cially troubled employers often use trust fund taxes to pay creditors,
expecting to be able to replenish the fund by the time their obligation
comes due. Many such entities become insolvent and unable to satisfy
the obligation. 66 When faced with this situation, the United States
may seek collection of the entity's unpaid trust fund taxes from other
sources, particularly those controlling persons who decided which
creditors to pay.167 Under certain circumstances, financial institutions
or other lenders who provided funds to the entity may also be liable
for its trust fund taxes. 168
1. 100% Penalty. Under the so-called "100% Penalty" provi-
sion, the IRS may assess and collect a penalty in the amount equal to
the unpaid corporate trust fund taxes from any person who was re-
quired, but failed, "to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over the
tax." 69 In order to assert the 100% penalty assessment, the IRS must
establish two elements. First, the person subject to penalty must be
"responsible" for seeing that the corporation's withheld trust fund
taxes were paid to the government.170 Generally, a finding of responsi-
162. Id. § 6672 (1982).
163. Id. § 6901 (1982).
164. Id. §§ 3101, 3102, 3402 (Supp. 11 1985).
165. Id. § 7501 (1982).
166. See, e.g., Barnett v. United States, 594 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 277-78 n.10 (1978).
167. See I.R.C. §§ 6671(b), 6672 (1982); see also Barnett, 594 F.2d at 221 (IRS
sought unpaid withholding taxes from Barnett who had founded the corporation, was
its president and administrator, and consequently was a "responsible officer" of it with
respect to which creditors it paid).
168. I.R.C. § 3505 (1982).
169. Id. § 6672 (1982).
170. See Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1978); Turner v. United
States, 423 F.2d 448, 449 (9th Cir. 1970); Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210,
1214-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
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bility will attach to persons charged with "control over the corpora-
tion's business affairs [and] who participate in decisions concerning
payment of creditors,"' 17 or those who have "the final word as to what
bills should or should not be paid, and when."' 172 Second, the IRS
must prove that the person "willfully" failed to pay over the taxes. 173
In this context, willfulness means a voluntary, conscious, and inten-
tional choice to pay other creditors instead of the government at the
time the wages were paid and the withholding taxes were due for de-
posit.' 74 Mere negligence is insufficient to establish willfulness under
this provision.'75 A reckless disregard of the risk that the taxes may
not be paid over to the government may, however, constitute
willfulness. 176
A third party assessed the 100% penalty should be aware of three
of the provision's unusual features. First, a 100% penalty assessment
is presumed correct. The burden of proving the impropriety of the
assessment rests on the individual charged.' 77 Second, liability may
attach to more than one person. 7 Finally, the IRS need not seek
collection from the underlying entity prior to asserting the 100% pen-
alty against controlling persons. i' 9
2. Lender Liability. The IRS may also file an assessment against
certain financial institutions or other lenders and collect unpaid corpo-
rate withholding taxes directly from them. 180 A lender, when it pays
wages directly to the employees on behalf of the employer, may as-
sume personal liability for the taxes that should have been deducted
and withheld from the employees' wages.' 8 ' Moreover, if a lender
171. Monday, 421 F.2d at 1214-15.
172. Dudley v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting
Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1957)); see also Griswold v.
United States, 209 F. Supp. 98 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (controlling stockholder who con-
trolled corporation's "purse strings" and decided the priority in which creditors were
to be paid was held liable for the 100% penalty).
173. See Monday, 421 F.2d at 1216.
174. See Dudley, 428 F.2d at 1200; Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 979 (1975).
175. See Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 842 (1979); Brown v. United States, 591 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979).
176. See Sinder v. United States, 655 F.2d. 729 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. United States, 561 F.2d
162, 165 (8th Cir. 1977).
177. See Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976); Monday, 421
F.2d at 1214-15.
178. See Gray v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Kan. 1984); Teel v.
United States, 529 F.2d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 1976).
179. I.R.C. § 3505 (1982).
180. Id. § 3505(a) (1982).
181. Id. § 3505(b) (1982).
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supplies funds to an employer for the specific purpose of paying taxes,
with actual knowledge that the employer does not intend or will not be
able to make timely deposit of the withheld taxes, the lender will be
personally liable for the trust fund taxes up to twenty-five percent of
the funds so supplied. 182
3. Secondary Taxpayer Protections. Secondary sources can avoid
or minimize the impact of the 100% penalty provision and the provi-
sion involving lenders' liability. Withholding taxes are comprised of
both a "trust fund" portion and a "non-trust fund" portion. The
"trust fund" portion of the tax is the income withheld from employees'
wages to pay withholding and FICA taxes. 183 The "non-trust fund"
portion of the corporation's obligation is the employer's matching
FICA contribution. 184 If the corporate taxpayer neglects to designate
how partial tax payments should be applied, the IRS will first apply
the payments to the non-trust fund portion. By so doing, the IRS
maximizes the trust fund portion of the taxes for which it can seek
collection from secondary sources. 185 A corporation, however, has the
right to designate that voluntary partial tax payments be applied first
to the trust fund portion of the taxes. 186 The taxpayer-employer can
thereby minimize, or possibly avoid, the unpaid trust fund taxes that
the IRS can secure from secondary sources.
In addition, an individual assessed a 100% penalty may petition
for a stay of collection. 187 In order to obtain the stay, the person as-
sessed a penalty must (1) pay the minimum amount required to file a
refund suit, (2) file a claim for refund of such payment with the IRS,
and (3) post a bond in the amount of one and one-half times the
amount of the assessment - all within thirty days of the notice and
demand.' 88 The person must then file a refund suit with a district or
claims court within thirty days after the IRS denies the claim for re-
fund.' 89 Unless the Secretary of Treasury determines that collection
of the penalty is in jeopardy, fulfillment of these requirements permits
182. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.3505-1(b)(3) (1976); see also Fidelity Bank v. United
States, 616 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1980) (bank did not have authority to compel pay-
ment of withholding taxes such that it would be responsible for 100% penalty even
though it was clearly liable for 25% penalty pursuant to section 3505(a)).
183. I.R.C. §§ 7501, 3101, 3102, 3401 et. seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
184. Id. § 3111 (Supp. 11 1985).
185. See Liddon v. United States, 448 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 918 (1972); Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
186. Pacific Nat'l, 422 F.2d at 33.
187. I.R.C. § 6672(b) (1982).
188. Id. § 6672(b)(l)-(3) (1982).
189. Id. § 6672(b)(2) (1982).
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the court to enjoin any collection action by the IRS.190
Finally, a 100% penalty assessment, unlike the normal refund
suit, may be challenged in district court or claims court by filing an
appropriate "divisible assessment" of the liability.191 The minimum
payment necessary to file a refund suit contesting a 100% penalty as-
sessment is the amount of tax that should have been withheld for any
one employee. 192
B. Fiduciary and Transferee Liability
Transferees and fiduciaries also fall within the reach of the IRS's
assessment and collection powers.193 Assessment against such parties
normally occurs when a delinquent primary taxpayer has failed to
fully pay his taxes and the person assessed has either received property
from the primary taxpayer without exchanging something of value for
it or exercised some degree of control over a delinquent primary tax-
payer. For example, where an estate has failed to pay its taxes, the
IRS may seek collection from a beneficiary of the estate who has re-
ceived property from the estate's representative or administrator. The
IRS may assess and collect taxes against such transferees or fiduciaries
in the same manner and with the same limitations as apply to the pri-
mary taxpayer. 194 The IRS must follow the assessment procedures
previously discussed for primary taxpayers.195
The elements of transferee liability are (1) that the transferee re-
ceived assets of value from the transferor without giving something of
value in return, (2) that the transferor had primary liability for the tax,
(3) that the tax was not paid in full, and (4) that the IRS has complied
with the applicable statute of limitations. 96 If these statutory ele-
ments are satisfied, the IRS may make a personal assessment against
the transferee and attempt to collect from the transferee's assets. 197 If
the transferee challenges the assessment in Tax Court, the burden of
190. Id. § 6672(b)(1), (5) (1982).
191. See Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1159 (3d Cir. 1971); Steele v.
United States, 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960).
192. See Fidelity Bank v. United States, 616 F.2d 1181, 1182 n.1 (10th Cir. 1980).
193. I.R.C. § 6901 (1982).
194. Id.
195. Id.; regarding the procedures which must be followed with respect to primary
taxpayers, see supra text accompanying note 46.
196. See I.R.C. § 6901 (1982); Treas. Reg. 301.6901-1 (as amended in 1961); see
also Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284 n.16 (1953). The requirement that the
transferee not give value for the assets received results from the definition of "trans-
feree" being limited primarily to donees, heirs, legatees, devisees, and distributees.
I.R.C. § 6901(h) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(b) (as amended in 1961). "Trans-
feree" also includes "any person who, under section 6324(a)(2), is personally liable for
any part of such tax." I.R.C. § 6901(h).
197. I.R.C. § 6901(a) (1982).
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proof rests on the IRS "to show that a petitioner is liable as a trans-
feree of property of a taxpayer but not to show that the taxpayer was
liable for the tax." 198
A fiduciary who allows distribution of the assets of a delinquent
taxpayer may also be found personally liable for any unpaid taxes after
distribution. 199 The United States' claim is generally paid first when a
person indebted to the government becomes insolvent and either
(1) the person makes a voluntary assignment of property, (2) the prop-
erty of the person, if absent, is attached, or (3) an act of bankruptcy is
committed. 200 The claim of the United States also enjoys priority
when a deceased debtor's estate is insufficient to pay all of the debts of
the decedent. 20 1 Because unpaid taxes are considered debts owing to
the United States, 202 a representative of a delinquent taxpayer's estate
who pays other creditors before paying the United States is liable for
the unpaid balance claimed by the United States.20 3 An executor,
however, may make a written application for release from personal
liability.2°4 Upon payment of the amount owed by the estate to the
IRS, the executor will be discharged from further personal liability. 20 5
Generally, the rights and remedies available to a transferee or fi-
duciary are the same as those described for the primary taxpayer. As
a practical matter, however, the IRS will make transferee or fiduciary
assessments only when it has failed to collect from the primary source
or it feels that collection from the primary taxpayer is doubtful. When
the IRS finally decides to make an assessment against a transferee or
fiduciary, it is not likely to be generous with terms of collection.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to effectuate voluntary compliance with the federal tax
collection system, the IRS is delegated broad authority to summarily
enforce collection. The primary collection mechanisms available to
the IRS for forced collection include the federal tax lien, summons
authority, and the powers of levy and distraint. As to each of these
mechanisms, a taxpayer possesses limited rights to contest perceived
unfair or unlawful collection action. A taxpayer would be well ad-
vised to assert these rights in order to protect his interests.
198. Id. § 6902(a) (1982).
199. Id. § 6901(a) (1982).
200. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1)(A) (1982).
201. Id. § 3713(a)(1)(B) (1982).
202. See Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
203. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) (1983).
204. I.R.C. § 6905 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6905-1 (1972).
205. I.R.C. § 6905 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6905-1 (1972).

